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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper aims to investigate the empirical relationship between the cost of debt 
(CoD) and accruals quality (AQ) of European listed firms during the period of 2005 to 2014. 
Also, it aims to test the impact of the interrelationship between the financial crisis (2008-
2009) and AQ on CoD. Finally, we decompose AQ into two components; the innate 
(InnateAQ) and discretionary components (DiscAQ) and test their relationships with CoD. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – To empirically examine the relationship between AQ and 
CoD, a sample including 15-member states of the EU is constructed. AQ proxy is based on 
the McNichols (2002) modification of Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. A univariate 
analysis and a multivariate analysis are conducted to examine the relationship between AQ 
and CoD after controlling for firm characteristics and institutional variables. 
 
Findings – We find a significant negative association between AQ and CoD in a vast 
proportion of the 15 countries under review. Also, the results indicate that during the crisis 
period, creditors pay relatively more attention to the quality of accounting information than 
during the pre-crisis period when they determine CoD of firms. Moreover, we report a link 
between the magnitude of this relationship and national characteristics and provide evidence 
of the significant effects of national characteristics and market forces on the CoD. Finally, we 
find that the InnateAQ drives the relationship with CoD. 
 
Practical implications – This paper provides up-to-date evidence of the economic 
consequences of IFRS and AQ. The results should, therefore, be of interest to managers, 
creditors, regulators and standard-setters.  
 
Originality/value – To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the 
effects of AQ on CoD for European listed firms. Also, it is the first to examine the impact of 
financial crisis on the association between AQ on CoD.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of a financial accounting system is to help users to make valuable 
decisions. Consequently, it is expected in the capital market that high-quality accounting 
information supports investors and creditors to make better judgments and decisions (Ewert 
and Wagenhofer, 2012). This implies that accounting information plays a fundamental role in 
the capital market (Lim et al., 2015; Nahar et al., 2016). Accordingly, previous studies tried 
to find out how the accounting information in the capital market affects external suppliers of 
capital by examining accounting information quality influences on the cost of debt (CoD) 
(Francis et al., 2006). This paper attempts to provide an answer to this question by 
empirically investigating the relationship between accruals quality (AQ) as a measure of 
accounting quality and CoD in 15 European countries. 
Further, we decompose AQ into two components, the innate component (InnateAQ), which 
reflects the economic fundamentals and business environment, and the discretionary 
component (DiscAQ), which reflects the management reporting choices, and test whether 
each component has the same effect on creditors’ decisions in the EU market after the 
adoption of IFRS in 2005. Previous studies argue that both components are priced in the US 
market (Francis et al., 2005; Core et al., 2008). 
In addition, all global capital markets have suffered from the financial crisis described in the 
media as the ‘credit crunch’ after the collapse of the US mortgage market in 2008. Of 
particular note is the effect the credit crunch had on the economic environment of European 
firms, which is characterised by a lack of liquidity (Duff and Einig, 2009; Iatridis and 
Dimitras, 2013; Bowen and Khan, 2014; Trombetta and Imperatore, 2014). In this context, 
we investigate the impact of macroeconomic factors – the 2008 financial crisis – on the 
relationship between AQ and CoD. 
Therefore, this study contributes to the growing area of accounting quality research in a 
number of ways. Firstly, this study has been one of the first attempts to thoroughly examine 
the effects of AQ on CoD for European listed firms. Further, using a sample from the 
European market has two advantages: (1) to test the influence of AQ on CoD, it is essential to 
keep other elements constant. Accordingly, using the European setting is an appropriate 
choice as since 2005, European-listed firms have adopted the International Financial 
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Reporting Standards (IFRS). Regardless of their nationality, all firms in the sample have, 
mandatorily, adopted the IFRS. Consequently, any differences among European countries 
regarding the strength of the relationship between AQ and CoD in the financial crisis cannot 
be linked to the differences of using local accounting standards. (2) Previous literature has 
used single-country samples, which leads to an uncertainty of external validity of the 
findings. Using a sample of European countries with a larger geographical area 
counterbalances country-specific factors and, therefore, provides solid evidence. Also, adding 
regulatory and institutional factors to the main model will make it possible to investigate the 
impact of those factors on the association between AQ and CoD (Filip and Raffournier, 
2014). 
Second, this study examines the impact of the financial crisis on the association between AQ 
on CoD for European listed firms. The financial crisis, the effects of which have been omitted 
by prior studies that examine the relationship between AQ and CoD, has a significant effect 
on the firms’ performance, which might motivate managers to manipulate earnings. In this 
regard, Filip and Raffournier (2014) assert that the consequences of the financial crisis on 
accounting quality are still not entirely explored and needs additional investigations.  
Thirdly, this study investigates the separate impact of InnateAQ and DiscAQ on CoD in the 
EU. Most of the previous studies that discussed this relationship focused on the US and found 
that creditors price both InnateAQ and DiscAQ in the capital market (Francis et al., 2005; 
Core et al., 2008). In the same vein, IFRS, the principles-based standards that have been 
applied in Europe since 2005, could offer management the opportunity to manipulate 
accounting information. However, it could help management to reflect the economic 
positions of firms correctly and report high-quality accounting information (Segovia et al., 
2009; Jamal and Tan, 2010; Agoglia et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2013). 
We report evidence of a significant negative association between AQ and CoD. This indicates 
that, in the European market, AQ is a substantial determinant of CoD. Also, the results show 
that during the financial crisis, the association between AQ and CoD is stronger than during 
the pre-crisis period. This finding demonstrates the vital role of macroeconomic factors in the 
association between AQ and CoD. In addition, it supports the notion that high AQ is more 
likely during the crisis period than during the growth period. Finally, we divide AQ into two 
components. (1) InnateAQ, motivated by economic fundamentals and the business 
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environment, and (2) DiscAQ, motivated by the quality of accounting standards and 
managerial choices. We then test whether these components have significant effects on CoD. 
It shows that InnateAQ, in the pre-crisis period, has a stronger impact on CoD than DiscAQ. 
During the crisis period, the results suggest that CoD is significantly affected only by 
InnateAQ; however, DiscAQ has inverse effects on CoD. This is consistent with the opinion 
that IFRS decrease the information risk of DiscAQ in the EU market, and accordingly, leads 
to either positive or no relationship with CoD. We attribute this finding to IFRS, which have 
been adopted in the EU since 2005. 
The rest of this paper is designed as follows: Section (2) critically discusses the literature 
review, and hypotheses development; (3) outlines the sample and how to measure variables; 
(4) reports the empirical findings; and, finally, section (5) concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A number of empirical accounting studies examine the relationship between earnings quality 
(EQ) and CoD (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2002; Francis et al., 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; 
Bharath et al., 2008; Zhang, 2008; Gray et al., 2009). The primary question is that poor EQ is 
linked with the high cost of capital (e.g., Mouselli et al., 2012; Artikis and 
Papanastasopoulos, 2016; Eliwa et al., 2016). This question is extracted from the theoretical 
studies and theories that support the view that high-quality accounting information is 
expected to reduce the cost of equity and debt capital, through decreasing information 
asymmetry and information risk (Easley and O'hara, 2004; Lambert et al., 2012). 
Empirically, Ahmed et al. (2002) examine the association between earnings conservatism as a 
measure of EQ and credit rating as a measure of CoD. They find that there is a significant 
positive association between earnings conservatism and credit ratings. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2006) add to this research topic and examine the relationship between EQ pre-issuing bonds 
and the credit rating at the issued time and find positive results. Also, Zhang (2008) tests the 
association between conservatism as a measure of EQ and interest rate as a measure of CoD 
and finds similar results. 
Moving to AQ as a unique measure of EQ, Francis et al. (2005) and Bharath et al. (2008) 
examine the impact of AQ on CoD, and find a negative association between AQ and CoD in 
the US market. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Armstrong et al. (2010, p.218), a limitation of 
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this research is that “absent performance pricing or renegotiation, interest rates are 
determined at the time the contract is initiated. Correlating current accounting quality and 
interest rates at the time the contract is initiated assumes that either accounting quality or 
credit quality, or both, are relatively persistent.”  
Using the Australian market, Gray et al. (2009) re-investigate the same association as Francis 
et al. (2005) and Bharath et al. (2008). They find a negative association between AQ and 
CoD. Using the Belgian market, Vander Bauwhede et al. (2015) investigate the association 
between AQ and CoD of SMEs and find the same results. Moving to emerging markets, Song 
(2016) investigates the association between AQ and bank loan syndicate structure in 11 
emerging countries. Song also tests the interaction effects between governance standards and 
accounting quality on bank loan syndicates. He finds that firms with poor AQ are expected to 
have a more concentrated loan syndicate. Furthermore, the results suggest that this 
relationship is more prominent for firms with superior governance. 
Overall, these studies provide converging evidence of the association between AQ and CoD. 
However, none of these studies have taken into consideration the impact of institutional 
factors on the association between AQ and CoD. Therefore, we investigate whether there is a 
negative relationship between EQ and CoD of European listed firms after the adoption of 
IFRS. In particularly, the following hypothesis is tested: 
 
H1: The cost of debt is lower for firms with higher AQ than firms with poorer AQ. 
 
Most prior studies examine solely the impact of the financial crisis on EQ proxies, however, 
none of these studies examine the effects of the interrelationship between the financial crisis 
and EQ proxies on CoD. For example, using a sample of nine Asian countries, Choi et al. 
(2011) find a significant impact of the crisis on the value relevance of the discretionary 
component of EQ. Conversely, they find no significant effect of the crisis on the relationship 
between the innate component of EQ and value relevance.  
Using a sample of five European countries, Iatridis and Dimitras (2013) investigate the 
association between EQ and the financial crisis in 2008-2009. They find that three of these 
countries – Greece, Italy and Portugal – have a significant increase in earnings management 
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during the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. Conversely, Kousenidis et al. 
(2013) examine the impact of financial crisis on seven EQ proxies by sampling the same five 
countries. They find, during the crisis, most of EQ proxies improved. Using a sample of 
European countries, both Filip and Raffournier (2014) and Arthur et al. (2015) find a 
significant increase in EQ during the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. 
In conclusion, these studies provide mixed evidence of the impact the financial crisis on EQ 
proxies. Also, it is clear that none of these studies test the interrelations effects of the 
financial crisis and AQ on CoD. Therefore, we are motivated by a question of whether the 
financial crisis has a significant impact on the relationship between AQ and CoD. As such the 
following hypothesis is examined: 
 
H2: There is a significant positive impact of the financial crisis on the relationship between 
AQ and CoD. 
 
AQ is affected by two primary factors; InnateAQ and DiscAQ.  InnateAQ reflects the 
operating environment and the business model of firms, while DiscAQ, reflects the quality of 
accounting information and managerial choices (Francis et al., 2006). Francis et al. (2005) 
investigate whether the two components of AQ have significant effects on CoD using a 
sample of US firms. They find that InnateAQ has a larger influence on CoD than DiscAQ. 
Using a sample of the Australian market, Gray et al. (2009) re-investigate the same 
association and find that the association between total AQ and CoD is driven by InnateAQ, 
with no apparent evidence that DiscAQ affects CoD. 
Since 2005, all listed EU firms were obliged to adopt IFRS. As such, they are required to 
follow IFRS in the preparation of their financial statements from 2005 onwards (Iatridis, 
2008; Eliwa et al., 2016). The primary objectives of adopting IFRS are to improve the quality 
of reported accounting information and to accomplish better comparability and transparency 
of this information (Ball, 2006; Iatridis, 2010; Iatridis and Dimitras, 2013; Dayanandan et al., 
2016).  
The proponents of IFRS contend that IFRS improves the quality of accounting information 
that is available to users, e.g., investors and creditors more than Domestic Accounting 
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Standards (DAS). They argue that IFRS decrease earnings management in financial reporting 
and focus significantly on the capital market benefits such as improving liquidity and market 
efficiency along with lowering the cost of equity capital. Consequently, it is more relevant to 
users than most of DAS (Gassen and Sellhorn, 2006; Ding et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010; 
Iatridis, 2010; Horton et al., 2013; Dayanandan et al., 2016). In relation to our sample, it is 
unclear whether the InnateAQ and DiscAQ will influence CoD equally as previous studies 
(e.g., Francis et al. 2005). This prompts our re-examination of the relationship between CoD 
and both the InnateAQ and DiscAQ. The significant influence of creditors on borrowing firms 
is expected to reduce the effect of information risk arising from DiscAQ. However, it is 
unclear how the adoption of IFRS will influence this relationship. Along the lines of previous 
research, our hypothesis tests the impact of InnateAQ and DiscAQ on COD in Europe after 
the adoption of IFRS. Specifically, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: InnateAQ has a stronger negative effect on CoD compared to DiscAQ. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
i. Accruals quality (AQ)  
Our AQ proxy is based on the McNichols (2002) modification of Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. Then, we rank AQ proxy and form ten deciles. Firms in decile ten have the largest 
values of the proxy which represent poor AQ, while firms in decile one have the lowest 
values of the proxy and represent high AQ (Francis et al., 2005). 
ii. The Cost of debt (CoD) 
CoD is measured as the interest expense of a firm in year t, deflated by the average interest-
bearing debt outstanding during years t and t+1 (Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009). 
iii. Control variables of the main model 
In this section, we discuss the variables regularly used in the prior studies and consistently 
found to have a strong relationship with CoD; these are firm size, leverage, ROA, interest 
coverage rate (IntCov) and earnings volatility (𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎). We measure firm size as a natural 
logarithm of total assets in year t. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets in year t. 
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IntCov is the total operating income divided by total interest expense in year t. Earnings 
volatility is the ten-year standard deviation (SD) of net income, divided by average assets 
(Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009; Lai et al., 2015).  
We expect a negative relationship between CoD and firm size. Larger firms have lower 
information asymmetry and more external financing resources than smaller firms. So, it is 
expected that large firms have a lower interest rate. Firms with lower leverage show better 
solvency than firms with higher leverage, so it is expected for those firms to borrow at lower 
costs. ROA is considered as an agreed measure of profitability. So, firms with higher ROA 
are in a better financial position and often acquire loans with lower borrowing costs. Interest 
coverage rate (IntCov) is a measure of firms’ capabilities to pay its interest. So, it is likely 
that firms with a higher rate of interest coverage to have lower CoD. Finally, we expect a 
positive association between earnings variability and CoD. Firms with high level of earnings 
volatility are expected to borrow at higher costs. 
iv. Sample selection 
Our sample covers all non-financial firms in 15-member states of the EU. Due to the 
significant impact of IFRS on EQ, this study focuses on these “early adopters” EU members. 
Luxembourg is excluded due to inadequate observations. Although Norway is not a member 
of the EU, it has been added to the sample because it has forced all list companies to use 
IFRS since 2005. 
The data consist of up to ten years of annual financial reports of publicly traded companies in 
the EU. The sample is constrained by one condition: each firm needs as a minimum seven 
successive years of data to calculate AQ. In particular, the model of AQ needs five 
consecutive annual residuals and both lag and lead CFO.  In total, the final sample consists of 
32,126 firm-year observations over the period of 2005 to 2014. We obtained the required data 
from the Thomson Reuters DataStream database. Panels A and B of table 1 report the number 
of firms per country and industry. To remove the effects of extreme values, we winsorised all 
variables to the 1st and 99th percentiles (Francis et al., 2005). 
Panel C of table 1 provides descriptive statistics on AQ, CoD and firm characteristics for the 
pooled sample. For example, the mean of AQ is 0.11 and the median is 0.07. The mean of 
CoD is 0.09 and the median is 0.07. The mean of leverage is 0.22 and the median is 0.18. The 
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mean of firm size is 5.04 and the median is 4.89. The mean of interest coverage is 10.15 and 
the median is 4.49. The mean of earnings volatility is 0.13 and the median is 0.06. Moreover, 
Panel C reports information of other variables. For example, the average of total assets is 
2,900 million dollars, and the median of total assets is 132 million dollars. The average of 
sales is 2,200 million dollars and the median of sales is 114.5 million dollars. 
Panel D of table 1 reports the correlations between CoD, AQ and control variables. It shows a 
significant positive correlation between CoD and AQ, which indicates that firms with poor 
AQ (large values) have high CoD. Also, it shows significant negative correlations between 
CoD and firm size, ROA and interest coverage. There is a significant positive correlation 
between CoD and both leverage and 𝜎𝜎(𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎). The correlation between AQ and any control 
variable is less than 49%; therefore, the multicollinearity problem is limited in the model. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4. MAIN TESTS AND RESULTS 
Univariate analysis of CoD is conducted across quintiles sorted on AQ from the lowest to the 
highest. We rank AQ proxy and create ten deciles. Based on the definition of AQ measure, 
decile ten represents low AQ, and decile one represents high AQ. Table 2 represents 
information on the differences between the average of CoD on both low (decile 10) and high 
(decile 1) AQ quintiles through the period of 2005 to 2014. The results show that low AQ 
quintile (Q10) has a significantly larger average of CoD than high AQ quintile (Q1). Also, the 
table reports that Q10 has a considerably larger average of CoD than Q1 in the crisis (2008-
2009) and pre-crisis (2005-2007) periods. This table also reports that, in both periods, firms 
in Q10 have a significantly larger average of CoD than firms in Q1. However, in the crisis 
period, there is a larger significant difference between Q1 and Q10 than the pre-crisis period. 
In the crisis period, the difference between the average of CoD values of the two said 
quintiles (Q10 and Q1) is 0.039 with t-statistic 14.27. However, in the pre-crisis period, the 
difference is 0.024 with t-statistic 9.19. This finding can be interpreted as in the crisis period, 
creditors give more attention to the quality of accounting information than a pre-crisis period. 
To sum up, these results provide initial evidence that AQ is negatively associated with CoD in 
the European market. 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
i. The relationship between AQ and CoD for EU listed firms 
In this section, the results of the primary model are reported. In particular, we examine the 
relationship between CoD and AQ in addition to control variables and country differences. 
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽4𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽5𝜎𝜎(𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎)+ 𝛽𝛽6𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼+ 𝛽𝛽10𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼+ 𝛽𝛽12𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽13𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝐿𝐿 Equation (1) 
Where:  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the cost of debt; 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 is a natural logarithm of total assets; 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 is total debt of a firm deflated by total assets; 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is net income before extraordinary items deflated by total assets; 
𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 is total operating income deflated by total interest expense; 
𝜎𝜎 is the standard deviation calculated using the previous ten years of data; 
𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 is the net income before extraordinary items (NIBE) divided by average assets; 
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 is accruals quality proxy. 
𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 is a categorical variable equal to zero for years 2005, 2006 and 2007 (the pre-crisis 
period), one for the years 2008 and 2009 (the crisis period), and two for the years after 2009 
(the post-crisis); 
𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼 is the Strength of Investor Protection index; 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 is the Rule of Law index; 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼: is a categorical variable equal to zero for code-law countries (CD), and one 
for common-law countries (CM); 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼: is a categorical variable equal to zero for German origin, one for French 
origin, two for Scandinavian origin and three for English origin.  
𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is the Importance of Equity Market index, which is measured based on the 
model of La Porta et al. (1997). 
 
a. The effect of financial crisis on the relationship between AQ and CoD for EU 
listed firms 
We divide the sample period (2005-2014) into three periods: ‘the pre-crisis’ for years 2005, 
2006 and 2007, ‘the crisis period’ for years 2008 and 2009, and ‘the post-crisis period’ for 
years after 2009. We test the interaction effects between financial crisis and AQ on CoD by 
adding the interaction variable. 
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b. The impact of country differences on the association between AQ and CoD 
Prior studies suggest that country characteristics have a significant impact on EQ (e.g., Ball et 
al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Li Eng and Lin, 2013; Filip and Raffournier, 2014; Song, 2015). 
Therefore, we examine the impact of these characteristics on the relationship between AQ and 
CoD. These characteristics are the legal environment and market forces.  
The impact of the legal environment 
A common argument in prior studies is that there is a significant positive relationship 
between EQ and the level of protection of investors in each country. It is based on the notion 
that high level of protection available in a country can limit the profit of insider trading, thus 
it decreases their incentive to engage in earnings management activities in this country 
(Kinnunen and Koskela, 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Haw et al., 2004; Burgstahler et al., 2006; 
Filip and Raffournier, 2014). Based on prior literature, we add investor protection variable to 
Equation (1). This variable is measured using an index provided by the World Bank named 
the Strength of Investor Protection Index (ShareProt). This measure is based on the average 
of three indices measuring the extent of director liability, the scope of disclosure, and the ease 
of shareholder suits in each country (Filip and Raffournier, 2014).  
Also, strong legal rules are essential to assure the protection of investors’ rights (Daske et al., 
2008; DeFond et al., 2007; Burgstahler et al., 2006). Therefore, our study adds the legal rules 
as a control variable, which is measured using the index provided by the World Bank named 
the Rule of Law Index (LawEnforc). It shows the level of confidence that citizens have in the 
legal rules of their country. In particular, this measure covers four issues: the court system, 
the police, the contract enforcement quality, and property rights (Filip and Raffournier, 
2014). A negative relationship between CoD and law enforcement is expected. 
Based on La Porta et al. (1998), we add two other proxies: the Legal Origin, and the Legal 
Tradition. The former is classified into four main types: French, Scandinavian, English, and 
German origins. The latter is classified into code-law and common-law countries. 
The influence of market forces 
There are two types of financial systems: market and bank-oriented. The two systems 
determine how companies raise funds. In the bank-oriented system, the bank is the main 
source of funds for companies, and in the market-oriented system, the stock market is the 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
main source of funds. Prior studies argue that in the market-oriented system there is a higher 
demand for quality of earnings by shareholders than in the bank-oriented system, possibly 
because in the latter, information asymmetry is resolved through insider communications 
with management (Ball et al., 2000; Ball et al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006).  
Following La Porta et al. (1997) and Leuz et al. (2003), we measure the importance of the 
stock market in an economy (ImpoEquity) using the average rank of three measures: (1) the 
total market capitalisation held by minorities divided by gross national product (GNP); (2) 
the number of listed domestic firms compared with population; (3) and number of IPOs 
compared with population. A high value on this measure shows that the financial system in 
the country depends more on market-based financing than on bank-based financing. 
 
Newey and West (1987) standard errors pooled regression is used to test Equation (1). This 
regression type mitigates the problems of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity effects. The 
results are reported in table 3. The results show a significantly negative association between 
AQ and CoD. We interpret these results as a sign that as firms’ earnings quality decreases, the 
amount of interest that creditors are willing to receive for a dollar of debt increases for such 
firms. In addition, AQ is a major determinant for creditors decision models, which is 
consistent with previous studies and thus supports the hypothesis of (H1).  
Also, table 3 shows a significant effect of the financial crisis on the relationship between AQ 
and CoD. This result could be interpreted as creditors showing more interest in AQ during the 
crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. In particular, the slope coefficient of AQ in the 
pre-crisis period is 0.0014. While, in the crisis period, there was an increase in the slope 
coefficient to 0.0029 (0.0014+0.0015). This indicates that the sensitivity of CoD to AQ was 
considerably higher (0.0029) during the crisis period than in the pre-crisis period. Thus, we 
accept the hypothesis of (H2). 
Moreover, table 3 shows a significant negative association between CoD and both 
shareholder protection and law enforcement. This indicates a higher CoD with lower 
shareholder protection, which is consistent with prior studies. The results also show a 
significant positive association between CoD and legal tradition, which indicates that COD is 
lower in the code-law system than the common-law system. The results also show a 
significant negative association between CoD and both legal origin and the importance of the 
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stock market. This result indicates that countries with financial systems that rely more on 
market-oriented financing have higher CoD than those countries that rely on bank-based 
financing.  
Moving to control variables, table 3 reports significant negative associations between CoD 
and Size, leverage and ROA, which is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Francis et al., 
2005; Grey et al., 2008). Firms with high ROA have lower CoD and large firms have 
relatively lower CoD compared to small firms. Also, firms with high leverage have higher 
CoD. Lastly, the table reports a positive association between CoD and both IntCov, and 
earnings variability (𝜎𝜎(𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎)), which is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Francis et al., 
2005; Grey et al., 2008). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
ii. The effects of AQ components on CoD 
Total AQ can be divided into two components: InnateAQ, which reflects the operating 
environment and business model, and DiscAQ, which reflects the discretion in financial 
reporting (Francis et al., 2005; Charitou et al., 2007; Gray et al., 2009). Using the model of 
Francis et al. (2005), we divided total AQ into these two components.  
Table 4 reports the results of regressing the CoD on both AQ components. It shows that the 
InnateAQ has a larger coefficient than the DiscAQ coefficient by a factor of six, and it shows 
stronger significance than the DiscAQ coefficient. Economically, the largest influence of 
InnateAQ increases CoD by 414 (46*9) basis points between low and high InnateAQ firms, 
whereas the influence of DiscAQ is 72 (8*9) basis points. This finding suggests that creditors 
allocate higher CoD to firms with poor AQ related to InnateAQ, compared to poor AQ related 
to DiscAQ. However, in the crisis period, the results show that the discretionary component 
has a positive impact on CoD, which indicates that creditors punish firms with high DiscAQ 
during the crisis period by increasing CoD. Finally, the results show that all country 
characteristics have significant associations with CoD. 
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
iii. Robustness tests 
In this section, we report the sensitivity tests that have been performed on our results. First, 
we use the raw values of AQ instead of decile ranks of AQ and run the test. We find a 
significant negative association between AQ and CoD, which is consistent with the findings 
of the main test. Results are reported in table 5. Second, we use panel regressions with fixed 
and random effects for CoD. Based on Hausman test, it is found that fixed-effects model is 
relatively proper than the random-effects model. Based on the fixed-effects model, there is a 
significant negative association between AQ and CoD, which is consistent with the findings 
of the main test. The results are reported in table 6. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This study extends the analysis of prior studies and investigates the impact of quality of 
earnings on CoD for a sample of European listed firms through the period 2005-2014. We use 
AQ as a proxy of EQ. We calibrate this proxy against CoD, a summary indicator of creditors’ 
decisions, to study whether AQ is viewed by creditors as conferring the maximum capital 
market advantage. We generally find a statistically significant negative relationship between 
CoD and AQ. We interpret these results as a sign that, as earnings quality of a firm decreases, 
the amount of interest that creditors are willing to receive for a dollar of debt increases for 
such firms. 
We also examine the impact of macroeconomic conditions – the financial crisis – on the 
association between AQ and CoD of European listed firms. The results suggest that, during 
the crisis period, the creditors’ allocation decisions were strongly affected by the level of EQ 
than the pre-crisis period. This finding demonstrates the influence of macroeconomic factors 
on the strength of the association between accounting information and capital market 
participants.  
Although the European countries are comparatively homogeneous in economic and political 
factors, the magnitude of the relationship between AQ and CoD varies from one country to 
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another. We indicate that the national features have a significant impact on the relationship 
between AQ and CoD. 
We also examine the separate effects of InnateAQ and DiscAQ on CoD. The result suggests 
that the InnateAQ has a larger effect on the CoD than DiscAQ. This result is consistent with 
the view that information uncertainty related to InnateAQ is relatively fundamental, 
compared to the information uncertainty related to DiscAQ, which can easily transfer from 
one period to another. This finding suggests that creditors reward InnateAQ by reducing 
CoD.  
To conclude, the results demonstrate the usefulness of accounting information to creditors, 
who reward high AQ by determining a lower interest rate (CoD). These results are relevant to 
managers, regulators and standard setting bodies. For managers, it is expected to work 
towards increasing the quality of earnings to reduce CoD. For regulators and standard setting 
bodies, the results show that the accounting information has a significant impact on market 
participants under IFRS in both code-law and common-law countries. This is important for 
them, mainly, when they prepare to change or review the accounting standards and 
regulations. 
Based on prior studies, there is no consensus among researchers for a precise measure of EQ 
(Dechow et al., 2010; Walker, 2013). Thus, it is interesting if future research employs 
different measures of EQ such as earnings persistence and earnings predictability, and 
compares their effects on CoD.  
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Table 1 
Panel A: Total number of firms per country and year a 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Austria 38 1% 38 1% 44 1% 46 1% 50 1% 48 1% 47 1% 48 1% 46 1% 44 1% 449 1% 
Belgium 55 2% 55 2% 67 2% 76 2% 81 2% 82 2% 82 2% 78 2% 75 2% 75 2% 726 2% 
Denmark 111 4% 110 4% 106 3% 116 3% 119 3% 120 3% 121 4% 122 4% 122 4% 117 4% 1,164 4% 
Finland 105 4% 106 4% 109 3% 111 3% 111 3% 109 3% 106 3% 107 3% 107 3% 106 3% 1,077 3% 
France 464 16% 472 16% 480 15% 489 15% 503 14% 489 14% 472 14% 462 14% 457 14% 433 14% 4,721 15% 
Germany 378 13% 381 13% 412 13% 462 14% 506 15% 508 15% 504 15% 480 15% 460 14% 430 14% 4,521 14% 
Greece 60 2% 84 3% 112 4% 139 4% 151 4% 158 5% 158 5% 158 5% 154 5% 149 5% 1,323 4% 
Ireland 33 1% 32 1% 34 1% 33 1% 36 1% 32 1% 31 1% 30 1% 30 1% 31 1% 322 1% 
Italy 130 5% 151 5% 177 6% 174 5% 184 5% 185 5% 179 5% 177 5% 176 5% 167 5% 1,700 5% 
Netherlands 99 4% 95 3% 95 3% 89 3% 90 3% 87 3% 82 2% 77 2% 73 2% 70 2% 857 3% 
Norway 114 4% 111 4% 119 4% 120 4% 125 4% 122 4% 122 4% 120 4% 115 4% 109 4% 1,177 4% 
Portugal 40 1% 40 1% 42 1% 42 1% 41 1% 40 1% 42 1% 43 1% 41 1% 41 1% 412 1% 
Spain 6 0% 7 0% 83 3% 87 3% 92 3% 95 3% 95 3% 96 3% 94 3% 92 3% 747 2% 
Sweden 247 9% 247 9% 260 8% 270 8% 292 8% 308 9% 307 9% 308 9% 303 9% 292 10% 2,834 9% 
United 
Kingdom 933 33% 962 33% 1,016 32% 1,077 32% 1,106 32% 1,084 31% 1,042 31% 1,003 30% 983 30% 890 29% 10,096 31% 
Total 2,813 100% 2,891 100% 3,156 100% 3,331 100% 3,487 100% 3,467 100% 3,390 100% 3,309 100% 3,236 100% 3,046 100% 32,126 100% 
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Panel B: Number of firms per industry for each year a 
Industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Agriculture, 
Forestry, & Fishing 17 1% 17 1% 18 1% 21 1% 22 1% 23 1% 26 1% 29 1% 27 1% 23 1% 223 1% 
Mining 103 4% 128 4% 154 5% 186 6% 222 6% 246 7% 263 8% 266 8% 255 8% 237 8% 2,060 6% 
Construction 95 3% 100 3% 108 3% 111 3% 112 3% 112 3% 113 3% 111 3% 112 3% 110 4% 1,084 3% 
Manufacturing 1,274 45% 1,298 45% 1,421 45% 1,493 45% 1,557 45% 1,541 44% 1,503 44% 1,468 44% 1,453 45% 1,382 45% 14,390 45% 
Transportation 261 9% 277 10% 314 10% 330 10% 348 10% 350 10% 340 10% 343 10% 328 10% 320 11% 3,211 10% 
Wholesale Trade 123 4% 128 4% 136 4% 138 4% 132 4% 129 4% 128 4% 125 4% 119 4% 113 4% 1,271 4% 
Retail Trade 185 7% 178 6% 185 6% 186 6% 184 5% 184 5% 168 5% 156 5% 152 5% 143 5% 1,721 5% 
Services 755 27% 765 26% 820 26% 866 26% 910 26% 882 25% 849 25% 811 25% 790 24% 718 24% 8,166 25% 
Total 2,813 100% 2,891 100% 3,156 100% 3,331 100% 3,487 100% 3,467 100% 3,390 100% 3,309 100% 3,236 100% 3,046 100% 32,126 100% 
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Panel C: Descriptive Statistics on CoD, AQ and Firm Characteristics, 2005-2014b 
Variable Mean 0.250 Median 0.750 
The cost of debt (CoD) 0.0936 0.0465 0.0725 0.167 
Accruals quality (AQ) 0.107 0.0364 0.0652 0.123 
Leverage 0.219 0.0330 0.179 0.331 
Size (log of total assets) 5.036 3.424 4.886 6.569 
ROA -0.0447 -0.0438 0.0234 0.0623 
IntCov 10.15 0.0443 4.485 20.02 
Total Assets ($ mils) 2,900 30.42 132 710.1 
Sales ($ mils) 2,200 19.91 114.5 643.7 
𝜎𝜎(𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎) 0.126 0.0282 0.0558 0.126 
𝜎𝜎(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅) 0.111 0.0393 0.0638 0.113 
𝜎𝜎(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶) 0.271 0.106 0.183 0.316 
Operating Cycle 5.121 4.541 5.044 5.593 
Negative Earnings 2.451 0 2 4 
 
Panel D: Pearson correlations between CoD, AQ and control variables 
 
CoD AQ Leverage Size ROA IntCov 𝜎𝜎(𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎) 
CoD 1 
     
 
AQ 0.1525 1 
    
 
 
<0.0001 
     
 
Leverage 0.3172 -0.056 1 
   
 
 
<0.0001 <0.0001 
    
 
Size -0.2652 -0.2981 0.2060 1 
  
 
 
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
   
 
ROA -0.1416 -0.2704 -0.0978 0.3742 1 
 
 
 
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
  
 
IntCov -0.1669 -0.0236 -0.3693 -0.0581 0.2723 1  
 
<0.0001 0.0053 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
 
𝜎𝜎(𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎) 0.2229 0.2612 -0.0514 -0.4755 -0.4903 -0.0607 1 
 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  
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Panel E: Institutional characteristics of the European countries 
Country 
Legal 
Origin 
Legal 
Tradition ShareProt LawEnforc ImpoEquity 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Austria German CD 5.5 2 7 0.51 
Belgium French CD 7 1 11.3 0.62 
Denmark Scandinavian  CD 6.5 2 20 0.40 
Finland Scandinavian  CD 6 2 13.7 0.34 
France French CD 5.5 1 9.3 0.24 
Germany German CD 5 2 5 0.50 
Greece French CD 5.5 1 11.5 0.68 
Ireland English CM 8.5 2 17.3 0.36 
Italy French CD 6 0 6.5 0.60 
Netherlands French CD 4.5 2 19.3 0.31 
Norway Scandinavian CD 7 2 20.3 0.31 
Portugal French CD 6 1 11.8 0.59 
Spain French CD 5.5 1 7.2 0.50 
Sweden Scandinavian CD 6.5 2 16.7 0.28 
United Kingdom English CM 8.5 2 25 0.15 
 
 
A,b The sample consists of 32,126 firm-year observations over the period 2005 to 2014 (8 industries). Size = the natural 
logarithm of total assets in year t; Leverage = the ratio of total debt to total assets in year t; 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = return on assets of a firm 
in year t, 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 = the ratio of operating income to interest expense of a firm in year t; 𝜎𝜎 = the standard deviation calculated 
using the previous ten years of data; CFO = cash flow from operations of a firm; Sales = net sales revenue of a firm; OperCycle = the natural logarithm of operating cycle of a firm in year t, NegEarn = the number of negative earnings that a 
firm reported annually out of the previous ten years. ShareProt is the Strength of Investor Protection index, which is based 
on the average of three indices measuring the extent of disclosure, the extent of director liability and the ease of investor 
suits in each country. LawEnforc is the Rule of Law index, which is used as a measure of legal rules, and it is measured 
using the average of four variables: the court system, the police, the contract enforcement quality and property rights. 
ImpoEquity is the Importance of Equity Market which is measured by the average of three variables used in La Porta et al. 
(1997): (1) the total stock market capitalization owned by minorities divided by the GNP; (2) the number of listed domestic 
firms divided by the total population of firms in the country; and (3) the number of IPOs divided by total firms in the 
country. Each variable is ranked such that higher scores show a significant importance of the stock market. Legal Origin is 
based on La Porta et al. (1998). All countries are classified into 4 main groups: German, French, English and Scandinavian. 
Legal Tradition is based on La Porta et al., (1998), all countries are classified into two main groups: Code-law (CD) and 
Common-law (CM). 
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Table 2 
The average values of CoD by AQ quintiles 
 High Low Diff t-stat Q1 Q10 Q10-Q1 
2005-2014      
CoD 0.079 0.114 0.034 26.29*** 
In the pre-crisis period     
CoD 0.081 0.104 0.024 9.19*** 
In the crisis period     
CoD 0.069 0.108 0.039 14.27*** 
 
This table shows the mean of CoD per AQ quintile. The column named (Q10-Q1) shows the differences in the average of 
CoD between the lower quantile (Q10) and higher quintile (Q1).  
t-statistics test shows whether the difference between the two quantiles is zero. 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. 
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Table 3 
Regression of CoD on AQ proxy (Decile rank) 
  
 CoD 
Leverage -0.053*** 
 (-29.7) 
Size -0.0028*** 
 (-18.9) 
ROA -0.025*** 
 (-16.8) 
IntCov 0.00036*** 
 (16.4) 
𝜎𝜎(𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎) 0.029*** 
 (11.5) 
AQ Decile 0.0014*** 
 (8.87) 
Crisis 0.0026*** 
 (3.89) 
Crisis # AQ 0.0015*** 
 (9.32) 
PostCrisis # AQ 0.00044** 
 (1.99) 
ShareProt -0.0020** 
 (-1.97) 
LawEnforc -0.015*** 
 (-11.8) 
LegalTradition 0.011*** 
 (6.81) 
LegalOrigin -0.0025** 
 (-2.45) 
ImpoEquity -0.00060*** 
 (-6.51) 
Constant 0.072*** 
 (11.5) 
N 32,126 
adj. R2 0.197 
See Table 1 for variables measurement.  
The sample comprises of 32,126 firm-year observations over the period 2005 to 2014. 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. 
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Table 4 
Regression of CoD on InnateAQ and DiscAQ (decile rank) 
  
 CoD 
Leverage -0.054*** 
 (-34.6) 
Size 0.00091*** 
 (4.09) 
ROA -0.025*** 
 (-17.3) 
IntCov 0.00049*** 
 (24.3) 
𝜎𝜎(𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎) 0.011*** 
 (4.25) 
InnateAQ 0.0046*** 
 (19.4) 
DiscAQ 0.00078*** 
 (4.29) 
Crisis 0.00063 
 (0.61) 
Crisis# InnatAQ 0.00038* 
 (1.79) 
PostCrisis# InnatAQ 0.00075*** 
 (3.22) 
Crisis# DiscAQ -0.0010*** 
 (-4.92) 
PostCrisis# DiscAQ 0.00027 
 (1.18) 
ShareProt -0.00042 
 (-0.41) 
LawEnforc 0.015*** 
 (11.7) 
LegalTradition 0.017*** 
 (10.9) 
LegalOrigin -0.0021** 
 (-2.01) 
ImpoEquity 0.000024 
 (0.23) 
Constant 0.021*** 
 (3.16) 
N 31,865 
adj. R2 0.217 
See Table 1 for variables measurement.  
The sample comprises of 31,865 firm-year observations covers the period from 2005 to 2014.  
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. 
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Table 5 
Regression of CoD on AQ (raw values) 
  
 CoD 
Leverage -0.056*** 
 (-35.7) 
Size -0.0031*** 
 (-20.7) 
ROA -0.024*** 
 (-16.5) 
IntCov 0.00037*** 
 (18.9) 
𝜎𝜎(𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎) 0.031*** 
 (12.4) 
AQ 0.022*** 
 (6.11) 
Crisis 0.0038*** 
 (8.82) 
Crisis # AQ -0.035*** 
 (-6.88) 
PostCrisis # AQ 0.012** 
 (2.28) 
ShareProt -0.00063 
 (-0.60) 
LawEnforc 0.015*** 
 (11.0) 
LegalTradition 0.017*** 
 (10.6) 
LegalOrigin -0.0016 
 (-1.50) 
ImpoEquity 0.000068 
 (0.65) 
Constant 0.067*** 
 (10.5) 
N 32,126 
adj. R2 0.198 
See Table 1 for variables measurement.  
The sample comprises of 32,126 firm-year observations covers the period from 2005 to 2014.  
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. 
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Table 6 
Fixed and random panel regressions of CoD on AQ (decile rank) 
 Fixed Random 
 CoD CoD 
Leverage -0.030*** -0.046*** 
 (-12.2) (-23.8) 
Size -0.0032*** -0.0041*** 
 (-4.92) (-17.1) 
ROA -0.010*** -0.017*** 
 (-5.68) (-11.1) 
IntCov 0.00028*** 0.00033*** 
 (10.6) (15.1) 
𝜎𝜎(𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎) 0.0011 0.029*** 
 (0.20) (8.94) 
AQ Decile 0.00034** 0.00081*** 
 (2.20) (6.39) 
Constant 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (28.5) (65.5) 
N 32,126 32,126 
R2 0.1564 0.1669 
Hausman  0.0000 
See Table 1 for variables measurement.  
The sample comprises of 32,126 firm-year observations covers the period from 2005 to 2014.  
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. 
 
